Michael Kevane

Everyone always mentions how corrupt the ATT regime became in Bamako and that is what led to the disillusion and civic disengagement, and eventually the stunning “fuite” of a sitting president jumping over a wall running away from presidential palace and then not even trying to organize political supporters to resist a military coup of the worst kind (junior captains accidentally taking over, but not until after they’d looted the banks….).  So everyone mentions it but since I don’t really follow Mali I always wondered what the specificity was backing up the perception/claim.  Just browsing this morning found a good case study of the complex issues.  Would be nice for an academic to write a whole book about the case.

Here’s one extract from an article (I have no ability to evaluate veracity):

Maître Madina DEME ne pouvait par ailleurs ignorer, que les hypothèques qu’elle a faites inscrire ne pouvaient porter que sur la partie non cédée et clairement définie de droits réels concédés à la SICG/Mali par la SICG/Côte d’Ivoire en vertu du bail à construction.  Or, ces certificats d’inscription d’hypothèque transmis par Me Madina DEME ne mentionnent aucune trace de cession de droits réels à des acquéreurs malgré une commercialisation avérée d’espaces pour 14 milliards.  C’est donc à cause de ces faux documents grossoyés par Maître Madina DEME que la BHM-SA a pu tenter des exécutions forcées contre la SICG/Mali et en outre en faire cas dans plusieurs procédures judiciaires.

And here is another article:

Les faits remontent au 19 septembre 2001. Tout est parti d’Ibrahima N’Diaye, tout puissant maire du District de Bamako, et vice président de l’ADEMA PASJ. Après la réalisation avec succès des travaux de construction des Halles de Bamako, Saidi Mohamed Jamal alors PDG de la société qui a exécuté les travaux, maintien de très bonnes relations avec les responsables de l’ADEMA (tout naturellement). La confiance s’instaure rapidement entre lui et Iba. Mais rappelons qu’à l’époque, le dernier mandat du Président Konaré s’expirait et les cadres politiques du Mali se battaient pour un positionnement sur l’échiquier. Donc nous étions proches de la précampagne. Il fallait à tout prix avoir les moyens de financer les élections présidentielles et législatives. Iba N’Diaye ne se pose pas trop de question. Il connait très bien Saidi, et il sait que celui là est liquide. Iba délègue Yacouba Diallo, alors Directeur de l’ACI pour rencontrer Saidi et lui demander une somme dont le montant exact n’a pas été révélé. A son domicile à Baco Djicoroni, Saidi débourse sans hésiter 100 millions de Francs CFA.  Plus tard, Saidi enjoint à un de ses collaborateurs de lui remettre 150 autre millions de FCFA devant Témoin. C’était à la BHM sous les yeux  de l’ex Pdg Mamadou Diawara.  Un autre versement a été ordonné par Saidi toujours d’un montant de 150 000 euros soit 100 millions de Francs CFA mais cette fois ci sur le compte de la belle mère de Diallo à la BRED en Août 2002. En Juillet 2003, Saidi verse encore une somme de 250 millions au même Yacouba Diallo. Cette transaction a été effectuée au domicile de Saidi Mohamed.  Selon Saidi « cette somme devrait participer aux financements des élections présidentielles et législative de 2002 et municipales de 2003. »

Given the 20 year history of massacres and killings in the region, economic incentives to control power, huge escalation in weaponry over last year, and disarray in Malian army, it seems too much to think that suddenly there would be a return to peace and security.  I am skeptical that the overwhelming military superiority of the French force would change the dynamic.  When the French occupied the region in the 1890s, they could destroy any organized force within months, but they could not be everywhere at the same time, so there were lots of little rebellions and inter-warlord conflicts.  Presumably a similar dynamic will unfold in the coming year.

Speech by General Carter Ham.  (HT Sahel Blog).  Seems like they should be aiming for something more enduring than a return to what was, in hindsight, a terribly unstable situation.

“Realistically, we would all like to see the elimination of al-Qaida and other [terrorist and insurgent groups] from northern Mali,” Ham said. “Realistically, probably the best you can get is containment and disruption, so that al-Qaida is no longer able to control territory [there] as they do today.” The general said extended governance would also prevent extremist organizations from controlling the lives of citizens in the country’s population centers, particularly Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal. “Those have to be freed and restored under Malian control,” Ham said. “So I think that is what I would see as the [desired] end state.” Ham made it clear resolving these issues is a task for African nations and not the U.S. “We very clearly see this from the U.S. government side, in fact and in perception, as an African-led endeavor that is done at the request of the Malian government and I think that’s well under way now,” he said.

I wonder if there is anyone advocating for creativity and experimentation as a deliberate approach, rather than the dry sober single-shot “program” that has the effect of leading to maximum embezzlement and minimal outcomes. A very disappointing conversation the other day here with a man involved in the MCC land tenure reform project in Burkina, suggesting that the huge perdiems of 25,000 CFA per day, for up to two months, was completely wasted… it simply meant that every connected schoolteacher and veterinary officer was trained to become a land tenure expert…. an expertise they would never deploy in their work capacity.  Once Congress allocates $297 million for “Northern Mali Sahel Anti-Terrorism Peace and Stability Initiative” (you know, NMSATPSI?) the resistance to trotting out tired old workshop trainers will be futile.

Someday we will know the insider story, but my only hypothesis, really, is that some analyst suddenly realized that the Islamists could come all the way to Bamako (in one day, as did JEM in 2008 in Omdurman and also in N’Djamena by coaltion of opposition to Déby in 2008), loot, kick-ass, burn down the presidential palace at Koulouba, take a whole bunch of hostages, and the Malian army would probably just let them… and then intervening in Bamako would be a real mess if they blew up the runway…. so it was a choice between two nightmares…. Maybe?

Mali was launching pad for the infamous French foray into Sahelian Africa…. here’s a repost from this past June.  I am sure the book and movie are doing very well right now.

Despite the ridiculous (truly!) cover this novelization of the infamous Colonne Voulet-Chanoine is worth the reading (it was also made into a film)  I hope we can get copies in every library in Burkina someday.  It recounts a little known but emblematic episode in the history of colonization of French West Africa.  In 1898, fresh from the defeat of the Mossi kings in central Burkina Faso, Paul Voulet and his friend and companion Julien Chanoine (son of a French general) were entrusted to lead a military mission to conquer the Lake Chad area.  The French were in a race with the British to secure for themselves all the unmapped areas of Africa.  With Lake Chad, the French would have control over the entire Sahel from Senegal to the border of Darfur (then an independent Sultanate as the British reconquered Sudan).  Controlling the colonies below Chad (now CAR, Cameroon and Congo) the French would have an enormous bloc on the continent.  But by design or misfortune, Voulet and Chanoince, once they had left the last French outpost at Say, on the Niger River, after Timbuktu, decided to pillage and terrorize their way to Chad.  They “went barbarian” as the saying goes, despite the likelihood that villagers and small kingdoms would have greeted them peacefully and been happy to trade, along the way.

The book spends time on a romantic backstory of Voulet.  I have no idea whether there is documentary record of the letters between himself and his prostitute wife who spurns him in the end (wow!).  Would be interesting to see if true.  This then forms the basis for psychologizing Voulet, while Chanoine is simply represented as a resentful sadist psychopath.  Anyway, good reading.  Nice description of their battle with Sarraounia.

The books is available here on Amazon.  If you read French, order a copy, read, and then send to FAVL to forward to the libraries.

At the same time, the crash in Mali has revealed some details of the commandos’ clandestine activities that apparently had little to do with counterterrorism. The women killed in the wreck were identified as Moroccan prostitutes who had been riding with the soldiers, according to a senior Army official and a U.S. counterterrorism consultant briefed on the incident, both of whom spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the matter.

The Army’s Criminal Investigation Command, which is conducting a probe of the fatal plunge off the Martyrs Bridge in Bamako, the capital of Mali, said it does not suspect foul play but has “not completely ruled it out.” Other Army officials cited poor road conditions and excessive speed as the likely cause of the 5 a.m. crash.

via Mysterious fatal crash April 2012 provides rare glimpse of U.S. commandos in Mali – The Washington Post.

The list of misspellings and lazy deadline-induced must-have-story-now inaccuracies is stunning…. all a repeat of Mamdani’s 999 mistakes when writing about Darfur….

The latest … OK maybe was just some kid who didn’t know there are actually two countries with very similar names, Nigeria and Niger…

“In the long term, France has interests in securing resources in the Sahel – particularly oil and uranium, which the French energy company Areva has been extracting for decades in neighboring Nigeria,” said Sold.

via The interests behind France’s intervention in Mali | World | DW.DE | 16.01.2013.